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Résumé : Le fonctionnalisme est une solution populaire au problème esprit–
corps. Il a un certain nombre de versions. Nous en exposons certaines parmi
les principales, en énumérant une partie de leurs caractéristiques les plus im-
portantes ainsi que certains « bugs » qui les ont entachées. Nous présentons
comment les différentes variantes sont liées. Nombreux ont été les pessimistes
à propos des perspectives du fonctionnalisme, mais la plupart des critiques
ne tiennent pas compte des dernières mises à jour. Nous finissons en suggé-
rant une variante du fonctionnalisme qui fournit une description complète de
l’esprit.
Abstract: Functionalism is a popular solution to the mind–body problem.
It has a number of versions. We outline some of the major releases of func-
tionalism, listing some of their important features as well as some of the bugs
that plagued these releases. We outline how different versions are related.
Many have been pessimistic about functionalism’s prospects, but most crit-
icisms have missed the latest upgrades. We end by suggesting a version of
functionalism that provides a complete account of the mind.
The mind–body problem is the problem of how the mental relates to the
physical. We know they are intimately involved: the physical affects the mental
when our body is injured and we feel pain, or when we drink alcohol and feel
intoxicated; the mental affects the physical when we decide to retrieve a book
and reach for it, or when we perceive the signal to cross the street and begin
walking. The first solution that comes to mind is dualism: the view that
the mental and physical are two different kinds of thing. While dualism is
intuitively appealing, it faces such serious difficulties (how to account for the
intimate connections between the mental and the physical, how the mental and
the physical could possibly interact, etc.) that it’s been mostly abandoned.
The other option is monism, according to which the mental and the physical
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are the same. What might seem like two things (or two kinds of thing) are
actually only one. The unpopular version of monism is idealism, which holds
that the mental is real and the physical is to be explained in terms of the
mental. The popular version of monism is physicalism, which holds that the
physical is real and the mental is to be explained in physical terms.
Bare physicalism does not completely solve the mind–brain problem: we
must still account for the precise nature of mental states. Behaviorists hold
that mental states are dispositions to behave in certain ways, but behaviorism
is another view that has been mostly abandoned because, among other reasons,
it has a hard time accounting for occurrent mental states such as conscious
feelings. Type identity theorists hold that mental state types are just physical
state types; for instance, beliefs are a certain type of physical state, and desires
are another. Token identity theorists hold that each individual mental state
is just an individual physical state, but mental types need not correspond to
any physical type. Type identity and token identity are helpful in grounding
the mental in the physical. But they do not explain the interestingly mental
aspects of those physical states (or state types) as opposed to other physical
states (or state types).
Functionalism is a popular option for explaining the uniquely mental as-
pects of the mind. What makes a state mental is its function, usually un-
derstood to be a relationship between inputs, outputs, and other functional
states. Functionalism thus allows us to explain certain states as playing a role
in the mind, while being consistent with physicalism.
Throughout the history of functionalism, many versions of functionalism
have been offered, with new features added, and certain bugs fixed. We provide
here an overview of the major releases of functionalism—a sketch of its version
history. We will list different versions of functionalism from its beta version
through its first release and subsequent upgrades. In the end we offer a final
upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1.
1 Functionalism beta version
The beta version of functionalism is simply the view that mental states are
functional states [Putnam 1967]. Functional states, according to Functionalism
beta, are states of a system individuated by (some of) their causal relations
to inputs, outputs, and other functional states. Thus, the picture of the mind
painted by Functionalism beta is the picture of a system that receives sensory
inputs, manipulates the inputs via a complex network of causally intercon-
nected functional states (i.e., mental states), and then produces behavioral
outputs.
Functionalism beta stands in contrast to dualism, according to which men-
tal states are non-physical states. Thus Functionalism beta avoids the noto-
rious pitfalls of dualism, including dualism’s inability to do justice to men-
tal causation. (But see Functionalism 1.1 below for an important caveat
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about functionalism vs. dualism.) Functionalism beta also stands in con-
trast to input-output (or metaphysical) behaviorism, according to which men-
tal states are nothing more than behavioral dispositions. Thus Functionalism
beta avoids the notorious pitfalls of input-output behaviorism, including its in-
ability to make sense of occurrent mental states (such as occurrent sensations
and thoughts).
Despite these features, the beta version of functionalism lacks too many
features to be a viable software package: What, exactly, are functional states?
Are they physically realized? Are functional types identical to physical types?
Functional states are individuated by their causal relations, but which causal
relations? Presumably not all of them, but then how are the relevant causal
relations picked out?
Functionalism 1.0
Functionalism 1.0, the first working release, includes the feature that func-
tional states are specified by a folk psychological theory [Lewis 1972]. Folk
psychology specifies a number of platitudes about the mind. For example:
people generally avoid doing things that cause them pain; or people generally
try to achieve what they desire. According to Functionalism 1.0, the conjunc-
tion of all such folk psychological platitudes constitutes a theory [Lewis 1970].
The terms of the theory refer to the functional states that correspond to men-
tal states. The relations specified by the platitudes between the functional
states, their inputs, and their outputs are the causal relations that individuate
the functional states.
Functionalism 1.0 turned out to have a series of bugs: it is doubtful that
there really is a suitable body of folk psychological platitudes about the mind;
if there were such a body, it is doubtful that it would constitute a theory in the
relevant sense; if it did constitute such a theory, it is doubtful that it would
be correct or precise enough to pick out people’s (or animals’) actual mental
states. Because of these bugs, Functionalism 1.0 never ran successfully.
Functionalism 1.0.1 replaces folk psychological theory with analytic truths
about the mind [Shoemaker 1981]. But Functionalism 1.0.1 never compiled
correctly because no one could find a suitable list of analytic truths about the
mind, so the project was abandoned.
Functionalism 1.1
Functionalism 1.1 avoids the bugs that plagued Functionalism 1.0 by re-
placing folk psychological “theory” with scientific psychological theory [Fodor
1968a]. The functional states are picked out by psychological laws, or perhaps
psychological generalizations, to be discovered empirically by experimental
psychologists.
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So far so good. But we still don’t know whether and how functional states
are physically realized. Some early proponents of functionalism went out of
their way to point out that functional states need not be physically realized.
They may be states of a non-physical substance [Putnam 1967]. If so, then
functionalism is consistent with dualism, with all its mysteriousness and no-
torious problems. Something had to be done.
Functionalism 2.0
Functionalism 2.0 attempts to solve the realization problem that plagued ear-
lier versions by including the feature that functional states are type-identical
to physical states. In other words, each type of functional state is identical to
a type of physical state [Armstrong 1968], [Lewis 1966], [Lewis 1972]. Thus,
Functionalism 2.0 is consistent with the type-identity theory of mind: mental
state types are physical state types [Place 1956], [Smart 1959].
A new bug arises with Functionalism 2.0: multiple realizability. Mental
states appear to be multiply realized. For example, pain appears to be realiz-
able in physically different neural (or even non-neural) systems. And functional
states appear to be multiply realized by different physical types; a smoke de-
tector in a smoke alarm can be made with an optical sensor or one that uses
ionizing radiation. Hence, functional types do not appear to be the same
as physical types, because functional types can be multiply realized, whereas
physical types allegedly cannot.
Functionalism 2.1
Functionalism 2.1 fixes the multiple realizability bug by replacing token iden-
tity for type identity. According to Functionalism 2.1, functional states are
realized by, but not identical to, physical states. What this comes down to is
that each token of a functional state type is identical to a token of a physical
state type, but different tokens of the same functional state type may be real-
ized by tokens of different physical state types. Thus Functionalism 2.1 entails
token physicalism: each token of a functional state is realized by a token of a
physical state (cf. [Fodor 1974], building on the token identity theory proposed
in [Davidson 1970]).
Multiple realizability raises the question of what realization is. Two main
answers have been given. Functionalism 2.1.1 conjoins multiple realization
with the so-called “flat” view of realization: when property P realizes prop-
ertyM , both P and M belong to the same individual [Kim 1998], [Shapiro
2000], [Shoemaker 2001]. So, for example, an object is a corkscrew because it
can remove corks, and the properties of that physical object that realize its
ability to remove corks include its hardness, its ability to apply a force via a
lever, and so on. A second object might also be a corkscrew because it also
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has the capacity to remove corks, but the properties that allow it to do so may
be quite different than those of the first.
This picture has been challenged by the so-called “dimensioned view” of
realization [Aizawa & Gillett 2009], [Gillett 2003]. On this view, realization is
a relation between a propertyM belonging to a system and a set of properties
P1, . . . Pn belonging to the system’s parts. For example, the hardness of a
diamond is realized by the properties of its carbon atoms. The conjunction
of Functionalism 2.1 and the “dimensioned view” of realization gives rise to
Functionalism 2.1.2.
Functionalism 3.0
Previous versions of functionalism asserted that the functional relations be-
tween inputs, outputs, and mental states are specified by a theory. After
Functionalism 1.1, such a theory is a scientific psychological theory. What
kind of scientific theory? How does such a theory specify the functional rela-
tions? Functionalism 3.0 adds that the theory is computational. Specifically,
the functional relations are computational relations specifiable by a Turing ma-
chine table [Putnam 1967]. As a consequence, according to Functionalism 3.0,
mental states turn out to be Turing machine table states.
One problem with Functionalism 3.0 is that a Turing machine is in one
and only one state at a time, whereas minds appear to possess more than one
mental state at a time. In addition, cognitive scientists never used Turing ma-
chine tables to formulate computational theories of cognition [Sloman 2001].
What they did use is computational models of various kinds. So while
Functionalism 3.0 ran, nobody wanted to use it.
Functionalism 3.1
To address the shortcomings of Functionalism 3.0, Functionalism 3.1 replaces
Turing machine tables with a computational psychological theory. The func-
tional relations between inputs, outputs, and mental states are computational
relations specified by the computational theory [Block & Fodor 1972]. Mental
states are thus computational states.
Functionalism 3.2
Functionalism 3.1 says psychological explanation is computational but
doesn’t articulate how computational explanation is supposed to work.
Functionalism 3.2 remedies this bug by adding that psychological explanation
is functional analysis [Cummins 1975], [Fodor 1968a].
Functional analysis, in turn, comes in three flavors. One flavor is simply
the analysis of a system and its capacities in terms of the functional relations
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between its inputs, outputs, and internal states [Fodor 1968b]. Another flavor
adds that the internal states are contained in functionally defined components
or black boxes, which reside inside the system [Fodor 1983]. A third flavor
says that functional analysis is the analysis of a system’s capacities in terms
of that same system’s subcapacities; the functions of these subcapacities are
nothing more than the contributions they provide to the capacities of the
system [Cummins 1983].
Although functional analysis applies to both computational and non-
computational systems, users of Functionalism 3.2 typically also maintain that
minds are both functional and computational. According to Functionalism 3.2,
then, the mind is a functional system to be functionally analyzed. The analy-
sis is carried out by a computational theory that specifies the computational
relations between inputs, outputs, and mental states.
Functionalism 3.3
Functionalism 3.3 adds the feature that the functions of the subcapacities
or components of the mind, in whose terms the functional analysis is car-
ried out, are teleological functions [Lycan 1981], [Millikan 1989], [Sober 1984].
Functionalism 3.3 comes in a number of variants, which makes things a bit
confusing. Teleological functions may be characterized in evolutionary terms,
as adaptations, but they need not be. Some supporters of Functionalism 3.3
maintain that once teleological functions are added, computational relations
may be dropped [Sober 1984]. But this is by no means a necessary aspect of
Functionalism 3.3. For present purposes, all that matters is that, according
to Functionalism 3.3, the mind is a functional system functionally analyzed in
terms of the teleological functions of its components.
Functionalism 3.4
Functionalism 3.4 further enriches the account of psychological explanation
that grounds functionalism. Instead of functional analysis, Functionalism 3.4
maintains that psychological explanation is mechanistic, that is, it is a de-
composition of a system in terms of its components, their functional activities,
and their organization [Bechtel & Richardson 2010], [Craver 2001], [Machamer,
Darden & Craver 2000], [Piccinini & Craver 2011].
According to Functionalism 3.4, the mind remains a functional system, but
a mechanistic one [Piccinini 2010]. The states and capacities of the system still
have functions, which may be cashed out either in terms of the contributions
they provide to the system [Craver 2001] or in teleological terms. If teleological,
the functions may be characterized either etiologically or non-etiologically.
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Functionalism 4.0
Mental states appear to have intentionality: one’s belief that the sun is a star
is about the sun. So far, functionalism has had nothing to say about this.
Functionalism 4.0 combines functionalism with representationalism—the view
that mental states represent. But what kinds of representation are mental
states? Functionalism 4.0 was never released on its own, but came in a variety
of versions, each answering this question in its own way.
Functionalism 4.1
One idea for how mental states might represent comes from a close analogy
with language. Language is productive: starting with some basic elements, an
infinite number of sentences can be constructed in structured ways. Similarly,
language is systematic: if a person can utter the sentence “Sheldon chased
Leonard” then she can also utter the sentence “Leonard chased Sheldon”.
Thought seems to have these same features, suggesting a natural parallel be-
tween the structure of language and the structure of thought. This is the
essence of the language of thought (LOT) hypothesis [Fodor 1975], [Harman
1973], [Sellars 1963].
Functionalism 4.2
Connectionism is one putative alternative to LOT.1 Inspired by early work
on perceptrons in artificial intelligence, connectionism views the mind as a
multi-layered neural network. Mental representations, then, are vectors of
activation within the network, established by the particular pattern of con-
nection strengths between the nodes of the network. This pattern of con-
nection strengths is sometimes explicitly provided to the network, but much
more often it is the result of learning and training [Rumelhart, McClelland &
PDP Research Group 1986].
While proponents of LOT have argued that connectionism lacks the re-
sources to explain the systematicity and productivity of thought [Fodor &
Pylyshyn 1988], connectionists have argued that their view of the mind is
more “brain-like”, and thus a better candidate for how the mind actually works.
Additionally, connectionist systems have built-in properties that LOT-based
systems lack, such as the ability to learn in supervised and unsupervised ways,
and the ability to degrade gracefully in the presence of damage.
1. Whether connectionism and LOT stand in genuine opposition to one another
depends on how they are defined more precisely. Cf. [Piccinini & Scarantino 2011,
Section 3.4] for more details.
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Functionalism 4.3
If a system’s being “brain-like” is a virtue, one can go further than connection-
ism. The kind of artificial neural networks employed by connectionist modelers
did not resemble neural systems in any very detailed way; rather, they were
loosely inspired by neural systems, with nodes and connections that resemble
highly simplified and idealized neurons. In other words, the artificial neu-
ral networks employed by connectionists did not (and were never meant to)
model how actual neural processes work, but how cognitive processes could be
implemented in a system of distributed nodes in a network.
Functionalism 4.3 takes off where connectionism leaves off: rather than
mental representations as vectors of activation in an artificial neural network,
this version takes mental representations to be vectors of activation in real
neural networks. This could be called neural representation. The view that
mental representation is neural is one foundational tenet of cognitive neuro-
science [Churchland 1989], [O’Reilly & Munakata 2000], [Vendler 1972].
Functionalism 5.0
Explaining intentionality requires more than an account of the format of men-
tal representations. It also requires a naturalistic account of the semantic
relation between mental representations and what they represent, i.e., a psy-
chosemantics. Functionalism 5.0 adds to previous versions of functionalism
such a naturalistic semantics.
As a first pass at a naturalistic semantics, Functionalism 5.0 is an inter-
nalist, or methodologically solipsist [Fodor 1980], theory. It attempts to give a
semantics for mental states without leaving the boundaries of the head, that is,
solely in terms of the relations between proximal inputs (such as retinal stim-
ulations), proximal outputs (such as motor commands), and internal states.
Sometimes this view is expressed by distinguishing between broad and narrow
content. Narrow content is semantic content that is contained solely within
the head [Segal 2000]. Because Functionalism 5.0 accounts for the semantic
content of mental representations in terms of functional roles that are confined
within the head, it is also called short-arm functionalism.
But meanings “ain’t in the head” [Putnam 1975], or so many people argue.
According to the popular externalist view about semantic content, semantic
content depends on relationships between mental states and things outside
the head. In fact, it has proven difficult to give an account of mental content
that does not include the relationship between mental representations and
things external to the system (in the system’s environment). Including such a
relationship leads to long-arm functionalism, of which there are several variants
depending on how that relationship is construed.
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Functionalism 5.1
The oldest form of psychosemantics is functional role semantics, which ac-
counts for semantic content in terms of functional relationships between en-
vironmental stimuli, internal states, and actions [Sellars 1954]. It is quite a
natural step to combine functional role semantics with functionalism [Block
1986], [Field 1978], [Harman 1973, 1999], [Loar 1981].2 After all, if mental
states just are functional states, the thesis that these states get their con-
tent by way of their functional role within a cognitive system is explanatorily
parsimonious.
Functionalism 5.2
The second oldest form of psychosemantics is deflationism about mental con-
tent. One version of deflationism is instrumentalism about mental content,
according to which mental content is just a convenient way to predict behav-
ior [Dennett 1969, 1971, 1987]. According to this version, pragmatic concerns
might invite, or even require, that we attribute mental contents (and attendant
propositional attitudes) to cognitive systems. But this attribution is nothing
more than that—an attribution—that is not in need of theoretical explanation.
A related view is eliminativism about mental content, according to which
mental content has no role to play within a science of the mind [Stich 1983].
Functionalism 5.2.1 sees mental content as a superfluous feature that earlier
users only thought was important. All of the real work provided by a scientific
account of mentality will have no use for (and couldn’t have a use for) mental
content. The correct account of the mental will be specified only in syntactic
terms, and as such, the individuation of mental states need not appeal to
semantics.
Functionalism 5.3
A third family of psychosemantic theories accounts for the semantic relation
between mental states and what they represent in terms of some combination
of information, teleology, and control. Briefly, a mental state has its content in
virtue of some combination of the natural information it carries [Dretske 1981,
1988] and its teleological function [Millikan 1984, 1993], which may include
the way it is used by the brain to drive behavior.
Functionalism 6.0
There is still a major hole in functionalism: the lack of an account of phenom-
enal consciousness. Why should any functional system be conscious? It was
2. Some versions of functional role semantics are more internalist, others more
externalist. Cf. [Harman 1999] for more details.
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pointed out quite early that, prima facie, a system that is functionally equiv-
alent to a human mind need not have any phenomenally conscious mental
states [Block 1978], [Block & Fodor 1972]. Functionalism 6.0 attempts to rem-
edy this by simply reasserting that some combination of functional relations
is enough to explain consciousness, perhaps in combination with a deflation-
ary view of what phenomenal consciousness amounts to [Dennett 1988, 1991],
[Lycan 1987].
Functionalism 6.1
A related way to account for phenomenal consciousness is representational-
ism about consciousness, according to which phenomenal consciousness is just
a representational feature of mental states [Harman 1990]. Rather than an
intrinsic feature of experience itself, consciousness is a feature of representa-
tions of experience: making this distinction allows for Functionalism 6.1 to
accommodate phenomenal consciousness.
Functionalism 6.2
A third way to account for phenomenal consciousness is property dualism,
according to which phenomenal consciousness is due to non-physical, non-
functional properties of mental states. This view may be conjoined with
functionalism about non-phenomenally conscious aspects of mental states
[Chalmers 1996].
Functionalism 6.3
A final way to save functionalism is to conjoin it with a type identity theory of
consciousness. Roughly, although many aspects of mental states are multiply
realizable and thus may be accounted for in terms of the functional relations
between inputs and other mental states, the phenomenally conscious aspect
of mental states must be accounted for in a different way, namely, as some
physical aspect of the mind’s realizers [Block 2006], [Polger 2004].
A related view of consciousness is that properties are both qualities and
powers, and it is their qualitative aspect—as opposed to their powers—that
accounts for phenomenal consciousness [Heil 2003, 2012], [Martin 2007]. By the
same token, it may be held that functional states have a qualitative aspect,
and in the case of states with appropriate functional roles this qualitative
aspect amounts to their phenomenally conscious status. We are not aware
of anyone who has combined the view that properties are powerful qualities
with functionalism, but we see no reason why it cannot be. The result is
Functionalism 6.3.1: Functional states have qualities, and it is those qualities
that account for the phenomenally conscious aspects of some mental states.
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Conclusion: get the latest upgrade
Having tested all versions of functionalism, we recommend that you get your-
self basic functionalism plus mechanisms plus neural representations and com-
putations plus naturalistic semantics based on information and control plus
properties that are powerful qualities. You’ll have a complete account of the
mind. Mental states are representational functional states within the appro-
priate kind of computational mechanistic system. Some mental states even
have a qualitative feel.
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